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ENCLOSURE

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Date December 12, 1975

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

TO: The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley

Ref: Hearing on Controls of the

Director, Federal Bureau of

F.B.I.

Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

Date December 10, 1975

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
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The United States Senate

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

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Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

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STATEMENT OF:

PAGE

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley,  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

2451

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## INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

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Wednesday, December 10, 1975  
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United States Senate,  
Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations with Respect to  
Intelligence Activities,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10  
o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building,  
the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee)  
presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,  
Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and  
Mathias.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick  
A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority  
Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederick  
Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles  
Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob  
Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea,  
Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff Members.

---  
The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is

1 the Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, the Director of the Federal  
2 Bureau of Investigation.

3 Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a  
4 troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative  
5 law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City  
6 Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as  
7 a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified  
8 to lead the Bureau.

9 The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation  
10 extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over  
11 the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the  
12 openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and  
13 their willingness to consider the need for legislation to  
14 clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.

15 It is important to remember from the outset that this  
16 Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's  
17 activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic  
18 intelligence operations. We have consistently expressed our  
19 admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative  
20 and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance  
21 of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic  
22 intelligence has raised many difficult questions.

23 The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather  
24 than on present FBI activities. The abuses brought to light  
25 in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director

1 Kelley took charge.

2 The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director  
3 Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous  
4 policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse. The  
5 FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelli-  
6 gence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance.  
7 The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in  
8 developing policies and standards for intelligence. These  
9 are welcome developments.

10 Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved.  
11 Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the  
12 Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress  
13 should take into account in thinking about the future of  
14 FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveil-  
15 lance should extend beyond the investigation of persons  
16 likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be  
17 outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain  
18 types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques;  
19 whether foreign related intelligence activities should be  
20 strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement  
21 functions, and what should be done to the information already  
22 in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in  
23 the future.

24 The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange  
25 of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney

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General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice Department in the next months as the Committee considers recommendations that will strengthen the American people's confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal law and for the security of the nation against foreign espionage.

Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off with, please proceed.

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1 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,  
2 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

3 Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and  
4 gentlemen.

5 I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in  
6 the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelli-  
7 gence and internal security fields.

8 I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the  
9 Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my  
10 35-year career in law enforcement you will find the same insis-  
11 tence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs  
12 of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with  
13 law.

14 I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative  
15 oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of  
16 the FBI ~~and~~ was being considered by the Senate Judiciary  
17 Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of  
18 that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

19 This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study  
20 of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been  
21 undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present  
22 Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest  
23 cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as  
24 possible in responding to your questions and complying with your  
25 requests.

1 I believe we have lived up to those promises.

2 The members and staff of this Committee have had unprece-  
3 dented access to FBI information.

4 You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type  
5 investigations and who are personally involved in every facet  
6 of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

7 You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who  
8 have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with  
9 all major areas of our activities and operations in the national  
10 security and intelligence fields.

11 In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these  
12 matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the  
13 Congress.

14 As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of  
15 necessity, fo~~f~~ocused largely on certain errors and abuses. I  
16 credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the  
17 hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's  
18 record of performance.

19 It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus  
20 on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the  
21 organization.

22 The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the  
23 lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted  
24 an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

25 A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year



1 to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence  
2 Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it found  
3 3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI  
4 Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370,  
5 less than three fourths, were approved.

6 I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were  
7 being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era  
8 when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative  
9 matters per year.

10 Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed  
11 regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate  
12 and understandable.

13 The question might well be asked what I had in mind when  
14 I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it  
15 did under the circumstances then existing would have been an  
16 abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..

17 What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is  
18 that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they  
19 felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General,  
20 the Congress, and the people of the United States.

21 Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and  
22 buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige  
23 to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and  
24 killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such  
25 acts of violence from New England to California.

1 The victims of these acts were human beings; men, women,  
2 and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or  
3 perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and  
4 appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement  
5 agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their  
6 rights.

7 There were many calls for action from Members of Congress  
8 and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other  
9 law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient  
10 demands, for immediate action.

11 FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a  
12 responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions  
13 designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed  
14 revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.

15 In the development and execution of these programs,  
16 mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

17 Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counter-  
18 intelligence Programs, and there were some substantial ones,  
19 should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.

20 We must recognize that situations have occurred in the  
21 past and will arise in the future where the Government may well  
22 be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's  
23 case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering  
24 agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet  
25 an imminent threat to human life or property.

1 In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried  
2 out now, can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigating  
3 only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the  
4 ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is  
5 a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to  
6 human life.

7 Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt,  
8 the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such  
9 preventive action should be available to the FBI.

10 These matters are currently being addressed by a task  
11 force in the Justice Department, including the FBI,  
12 and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can  
13 be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress  
14 to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible  
15 manner.

16 Probably the most important question here today is what  
17 assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose  
18 under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

19 First, let me assure the Committee that some very sub-  
20 stantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's  
21 methods of operations since I took the oath of office as  
22 Director on July 9, 1973.

23 Today we place a high premium on openness, openness  
24 both within and without the service.

25 I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion

1 in the decision-making process which insures that no future  
2 program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a  
3 full and critical review of its propriety.

4 Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

5 I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and  
6 Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of  
7 position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts  
8 and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or  
9 reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

10 The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take  
11 full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum  
12 critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner  
13 weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

14 The results of this program have been most beneficial~~X~~ to  
15 me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to  
16 the morale of our employees.

17 In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past  
18 were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside  
19 the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's  
20 guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his  
21 own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

22 Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi  
23 instructed that I immediately report to him any requests  
24 or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which,  
25 considering the context of the request, I believed presented

1 the appearances of impropriety.

2 I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the  
3 Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years as  
4 Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no  
5 one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise,  
6 to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper  
7 purposes.

8 I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider  
9 honoring any such request.

10 I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI  
11 I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and  
12 the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including  
13 those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and  
14 practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order  
15 that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities  
16 over the FBI.

17 I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today  
18 is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity  
19 can be assured only through institutional means.

20 Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the  
21 character of the person who occupies the office of the  
22 Director and every member of the FBI under him.

23 I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is  
24 my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism,  
25 their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally

1 demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the  
2 nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct  
3 at all times by the FBI.

4 The Congress and the members of this Committee in  
5 particular have gained a great insight into the problems  
6 confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields ~~X~~  
7 problems which all too often we have <sup>BEEN</sup> left to resolve without  
8 sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress  
9 itself.

10 As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been  
11 made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our  
12 failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even  
13 to the Executive Branch.

14 The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for  
15 FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

16 An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the  
17 Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI  
18 Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully  
19 committed to maximum participation with the members of that  
20 Subcommittee.

21 I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very  
22 recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

23 One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee  
24 has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex  
25 problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that

1 those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step,  
2 a step that I believe is absolutely essential, a legislative  
3 charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence  
4 jurisdiction for the FBI.

5 Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the  
6 security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it  
7 must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress  
8 nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to  
9 the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in  
10 the past.

11 This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role  
12 not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of  
13 our performance.

14 I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the  
15 courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that  
16 have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role  
17 of the courts into the early stages of the investigative  
18 process and, thereby, would take over what historically have  
19 been Executive Branch decisions.

20 I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would  
21 seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast  
22 them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our  
23 Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Con-  
24 gressional oversight or Executive decision.

25 The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination

1 of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional  
2 statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both  
3 the will and the needs of the American people.

4 Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a  
5 career police officer. In my police experience, the most  
6 frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing  
7 law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, ~~is~~ ~~is~~  
8 <sup>ARE WHEN</sup> when demands are made of them to perform their traditional  
9 role as protector of life and property without <sup>a</sup> clear and  
10 understandable legal bases to do so.

11 I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative  
12 charter will be a most precise and demanding task.

13 It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle  
14 the FBI's effectiveness in combating the growing incidence  
15 of crime and violence across the United States. That charter  
16 must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past;  
17 yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and  
18 so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive  
19 challenges.

20 The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced  
21 the formulation of operational guidelines governing our  
22 intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need  
23 for legislation. The responsibility for conferring juris-  
24 diction resides with the Congress.

25 In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which



1 question the need for intelligence gathering <sup>AND</sup> ~~suggesting~~ that  
2 information needed for the prevention of violence can be  
3 acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

4 As a practical matter, the line between intelligence  
5 work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult  
6 to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may  
7 well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there  
8 are some fundamental differences between these investigations  
9 that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective  
10 and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a  
11 crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to  
12 identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence  
13 for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows  
14 the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is  
15 limited and fairly well defined.

16 By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of  
17 information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be  
18 not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the  
19 Government has enough information to meet any future crisis  
20 or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it  
21 must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether  
22 the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the  
23 means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability  
24 of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on  
25 our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation,

1 in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelli-  
2 gence.

3 Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues.  
4 Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need  
5 for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction  
6 of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not  
7 the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every  
8 citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution  
9 of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful  
10 deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the  
11 complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or  
12 its successors in this important task.

13 In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as  
14 Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit  
15 of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

16 That is the substance of my prepared statement.

17 I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note  
18 that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary  
19 Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented  
20 to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time,  
21 I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result  
22 in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate.  
23 I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that  
24 time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of  
25 the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take

1 them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I  
 2 have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this  
 3 not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might  
 4 place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek  
 5 sanctuary and, perhaps a safe sanctuary, by saying during the  
 6 period these things occurred, I was with the local police  
 7 department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time,  
 8 however, I was in the FBI.

9 During the time I was with the FBI, <sup>and</sup> during the time I  
 10 was with the police department, I continued throughout that  
 11 period a close acquaintance with, and a strong affection for,  
 12 the FBI.

13 I only want to point out that based on those years, based  
 14 on those observations, we have here a very fine and very  
 15 sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there  
 16 is much that can still be done. I know that we are not without  
 17 fault. I know that from <sup>the</sup> those experiences I have had. We  
 18 will not be completely without fault in the future. But I  
 19 assure you that we look upon this inquiry, we look upon any  
 20 mandate which you may feel you have, ~~that you should look at~~  
 21 <sup>AS</sup> ~~this is~~ good and proper, ~~and we do not intend~~ I only want  
 22 to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a  
 23 matchless organization, ~~one which~~ I continue to say <sup>IT</sup> was  
 24 ~~not~~ motivated in <sup>most</sup> some of these instances, ~~and in most of~~  
 25 ~~them,~~ and I cannot justify some, <sup>BUT</sup> ~~that~~ the motivation was of the

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1 best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am  
 2 only putting in your thinking my objective observations as  
 3 a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this  
 4 organization. It is too precious for us to have it in  
 5 a condition of jeopardy.

6 Thank you very much.

7 The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.

8 I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able  
 9 to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one  
 10 question he would like to ask.

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1 Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  
2 Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30.  
3 ~~I have~~ **I HAVE** several questions, and I'm sure they'll be  
4 covered by others, but the ones that I have is a result of  
5 reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and  
6 it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the  
7 top of 11.

8 There you are indicating that you caution us about  
9 extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations  
10 suggesting that this might take us beyond the role contemplated  
11 for the courts under the Constitution.

12 Now, as you have said, aside from the so-called national  
13 security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussion's  
14 and concern has been on the possibility requiring court  
15 approval for the use of informants, informants directed to  
16 penetrate and report on some group.

17 And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen,  
18 pointed out that really those informants are the most pervasive  
19 type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device. It's  
20 really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy  
21 than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He  
22 can ask me questions to get information the government would  
23 like to have.

24 Now, we certainly involve the courts in approval of the  
25 wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters

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1 of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate  
2 screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the  
3 informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a  
4 general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval  
5 would violate the role envisaged for the courts.

6 And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to  
7 my feelings.

8 Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the  
9 informant ~~in intrusion~~, which is to this extent objectionable.

10 ~~It has of course been approved,~~ <sup>T</sup> The concept of the informant ~~X~~  
11 <sup>HAS BEEN APPROVED</sup> by numerous court decisions.

12 Let us go ~~down~~ not to the moral connotation of the use  
13 of the informant....

14 I think, as in many cases, <sup>IT</sup> ~~that~~ is a matter of balance.

15 You have only very few ways of solving crimes, <sup>ONE OF</sup> ~~You have~~  
16 <sup>WHICH IS</sup> ~~basically in~~ the use of the informant, I ~~think~~ ~~the protection~~

17 ~~of the right of the victim to be victimized.~~ You have within

18 the Constitution certain grants, <sup>AND</sup> ~~that are under ordinary~~  
19 ~~circumstances abrogation of rights.~~ The right <sup>TO</sup> of search and

20 seizure, <sup>REASONABLY</sup> ~~which, of course, can't be unreasonable, but none-~~  
21 ~~theless, you have the right.~~ <sup>ISA</sup>

22 I think that were we to lose the right of the informant,  
23 we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing our  
24 job.

25 Now, I'm not arguing with you, Senator, that it is not an

1 unusual procedure. I'm not even going to say that it is not  
2 an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one, I think  
3 ~~that is~~ <sup>THE</sup> by virtue of the benefits must be counted.

4 We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that  
5 are attendant. We take great care.

6 Now, you say about the court ~~having possibility~~ taking  
7 jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we  
8 could present the matter to the court, but what are they going  
9 to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to  
10 have to follow it all the way through?

11 Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts.  
12 Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court  
13 given for each contact?

14 There are a great many problems insofar as administration  
15 of it.

16 I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my  
17 idea -- I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over  
18 the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are  
19 going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this  
20 is going to happen no matter what you do.

21 Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your  
22 reaction.

23 I was not suggesting that there is consideration here to  
24 prohibit informants. I was reflecting a view that I felt and  
25 hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as

1 you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a  
2 third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is  
3 warranted by the particular circumstance. But I do understand  
4 your position.

5 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

7 (Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)

8 The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have questions?

9 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

10 Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your  
11 organization and I personally regret that the organization is  
12 in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that  
13 it is, along with other agencies and departments of the  
14 government.

15 I think you probably would agree with me that even though  
16 that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects  
17 unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives  
18 us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity,  
19 at least, to improve the level of competency and service of  
20 the government itself.

21 With that hopeful note, would you be agreeable then to  
22 volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve  
23 the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or  
24 indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government,  
25 to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and



1 beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on  
2 how you would provide the methods, the access, the documents,  
3 the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its  
4 essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to  
5 see that these functions, these delicate functions are being  
6 undertaken properly?

7 And before you answer, let me tell you two or three things  
8 I am concerned about.

9 It hasn't been long ago that the FBI Director was not  
10 even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe  
11 you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the  
12 United States. I think that is a movement in the right  
13 direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature ~~that~~ and  
14 additional importance that requires it to have closer supervision  
15 and scrutiny by us.

16 At the same time, I rather doubt that we can become  
17 involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney  
18 General.

19 Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General  
20 needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the  
21 FBI.

22 I would appreciate any comments on that.

23 Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the  
24 intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so  
25 that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a

1 look at these decisions and the process by which they were  
2 made to decide that you are or you are not performing your  
3 services diligently.

4 I don't think you can have oversight unless you have  
5 access to records, and in many cases records don't exist  
6 and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now  
7 departed and in other cases you have conflicts.

8 How would you suggest then that you improve the quality  
9 of service of your agency? How would you propose that you  
10 increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the  
11 United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving  
12 the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that  
13 is required?

14 Mr. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering  
15 this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling  
16 what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed,  
17 One which is beyond my control, but which I think is very  
18 important, is that the position of Director <sup>AS</sup> the one to which  
19 great attention should be paid in choosing the man, ~~who will~~  
20 ~~properly acquit himself.~~

21 I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going  
22 over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most  
23 necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means  
24 of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency  
25 toward consulting with other members of the official family,

1 that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with  
2 no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very  
3 carefully.

4 I think further that he should be responsible for those  
5 matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.

6 Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a second? Who  
7 does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for  
8 the President of the United States, for the Attorney General,  
9 for the Justice Department, for the Executive Branch?

10 Who does the executive of the FBI, the Director of the  
11 FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to?

12 Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General,  
13 but I think this is such an important field of influence that  
14 it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the  
15 judiciary, the legislative, <sup>URE</sup> and, of course, we are under the  
16 Attorney General.

17 Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea  
18 of the President of the United States calling the Director of  
19 the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?

20 Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that  
21 the relationship between the FBI Director and the President  
22 is such that that is desirable, or should it be conducted  
23 through the Attorney General?

24 Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority

25 of the cases conducted through the Attorney General. There

1 has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if  
2 the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he  
3 may do so, call him directly.

4 It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter  
5 report to the Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I  
6 have been called over, and I ~~discussed and was told.~~ ~~And this~~  
7 was revealed in full to them. **WHAT WAS DISCUSSED.**

8 Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that  
9 says the President has to go through the Attorney General,  
10 although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous,

11 But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary  
12 for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the  
13 Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least  
14 some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of  
15 the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?

16 Do you think that these things need to be handled in  
17 a more formal way?

18 Mr. Kelley. Personally, it would be my practice in  
19 the event I receive such an order, to request that it be  
20 documented. This is a protection as well as a clarification,  
21 **A**s to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation,  
22 I frankly would like to reserve that for some more considera-  
23 tion.

24 I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it  
25 can be worked very easily.

1 Senator Baker. Mr. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I  
2 believe, has already established some sort of agency or  
3 function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent,  
4 I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department,  
5 including the FBI.

6 Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has  
7 taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of  
8 Professional Responsibility.

9 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

10 Senator Baker. Do you have any comment on that? Will  
11 you give us any observations as to whether you think that  
12 will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or  
13 helpful, how it affects the FBI, how you visualize your  
14 relationship to it in the future?

15 Mr. Kelley. I don't object to this, which is to some  
16 extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the  
17 Attorney General.

18 Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it  
19 completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely  
20 subscribe.

21 Senator Baker. How would you feel about extending that  
22 concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector  
23 General who is involved with an oversight of all of the  
24 agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionally  
25 protected rights of the individual citizen? Would you care

1 to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while?

2 Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.

3 Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about  
4 it and let us know what you think about it?

5 Mr. Kelley. I will..

6 Senator Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very  
7 much.

8 The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.

9 Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 Mr. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that  
11 existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during  
12 this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the  
13 Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them  
14 by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and  
15 the people of the United States.

16 Does not this suggest that there has been a reaction  
17 there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the  
18 country because of certain circumstances rather than any  
19 clear and specific direct instructions that might have been  
20 received from proper authorities? And if that is the case,  
21 is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline,  
22 to provide for that kind of specific instruction?

23 Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can  
24 logically be incorporated and that --

25 Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing

1 danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the  
2 attitudes may be at a specific time in this country because --

3 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I don't contemplate it ~~might be~~ <sup>ING</sup>  
4 a continuing danger, but <sup>there</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>a</sup> certainly would be a very acceptable  
5 guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems  
6 to arise, know what we can do.

7 Senator Huddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which  
8 Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether or not we can  
9 provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the  
10 court in determining what action might be proper and specific-  
11 ally in protecting individual's rights, can't we also  
12 provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various  
13 techniques that might be used?

14 For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as  
15 has already been done, that informants are necessary and  
16 desirable. How do we keep that informant operating within the  
17 proper limits so that he, in fact, is not violating individual  
18 rights?

19 Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must  
20 be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure  
21 that there is no infringement of rights.

22 Senator Huddleston. But this is an <sup>area</sup> ~~aware~~ we've gotten  
23 into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the  
24 particular action was necessary, that there was a present  
25 threat that some intelligence programs should be initiated, but

1 in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been  
2 necessary to have addressed the original threat.

3 How do we keep within the proper balance there?

4 Mr. Kelley. Well, actually, it's just about like any  
5 other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's  
6 right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer.  
7 There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.

8 This is one which I think might flow if he counsels  
9 the informant.

10 Now, insofar as his inability to control the informant,  
11 I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is  
12 still supervisory control over that agent and over that  
13 informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing  
14 basis.

15 Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point  
16 as to whether or not a law enforcement agency ought to be  
17 very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone  
18 else.

19 If a White House official asks the FBI or someone to do  
20 something unlawful, the question seems to me to occur as to  
21 whether or not that is not a violation that should be reported  
22 by the FBI.

23 Mr. Kelley. I think that any violation which comes to  
24 our attention should either be handled by us or the proper  
25 authority.



1 Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the  
2 past.

3 Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't know what you're referring  
4 to but I would think your statement is proper.

5 Senator Huddleston. Well, we certainly have evidence  
6 of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that  
7 have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to  
8 light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies.

9 The question that I'm really concerned about is as  
10 we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give  
11 the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide  
12 range of threats, how do we control what happens within each  
13 of those actions to keep them from going beyond what  
14 was intended to begin with?

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1 Mr. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants?

2 Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents  
3 themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever  
4 intelligence gathering techniques.

5 The original thrust of my question was, even though we  
6 may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do  
7 we control the techniques that might be used, that in themselves  
8 might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation  
9 of the rights.

10 Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's  
11 germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed  
12 out that the association to, the relationship between the  
13 informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one,  
14 and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guide-  
15 lines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here  
16 because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship.  
17 Insofar as the activities of agents, informants or others  
18 which may be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of  
19 violations of the law on the part of informants, and either  
20 prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the  
21 United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority.  
22 We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar  
23 as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the  
24 Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and  
25 if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would

1 pursue it to the point of prosecution.

2 Senator Huddleston. But it could be helped by periodic  
3 review.

4 Mr. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the  
5 activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection  
6 Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well  
7 as other matters.

8 Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed out the  
9 difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in  
10 gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.

11 Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to  
12 attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the  
13 departments, for instance, with not having a mixing of  
14 gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques  
15 definable and different??

16 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible. I  
17 see no objection to the way that they are now being handled  
18 on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fact, it is  
19 a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as  
20 it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.

21 Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes  
22 information to numerous government agencies.

23 Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present  
24 time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for  
25 information, what kind of information they can ask for, and

1 probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put  
2 on the use of that information once it has been supplied by  
3 the FBI?

4 Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator.

5 Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictions  
6 now?

7 Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves judge  
8 in all cases whether or not there is good and sufficient reason  
9 for an Agency to inquiry<sup>e</sup>. I think that there should be a  
10 very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're  
11 going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules  
12 that at least to us we are satisfied.

13 Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information  
14 your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment  
15 of the rights of any individuals.

16 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I  
17 do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.

18 Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some  
19 inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to  
20 who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed  
21 on what the request, and what they can do with it after they  
22 get it.

23 Mr. Kelley. Yes.

24 Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact  
25 that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just

1 bound to gather a great deal of information about some  
2 individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelli-  
3 gence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarrass-  
4 ing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any  
5 effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's  
6 file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific  
7 purpose unrelated to this information.

8 Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to  
9 doing that?

10 Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the  
11 guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which  
12 is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objection-  
13 able.

14 Senator Huddleston. And how about the length of time  
15 that these files are kept in the agency?

16 Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework,  
17 too.

18 Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done.

19 Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to  
20 speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the  
21 President of the United States from calling up the head of  
22 the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement  
23 problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction  
24 to the agency.

25 But how about that? What about White House personnel

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1 who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him  
2 to do specific things?

3 Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether  
4 or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such  
5 project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?

6 Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must  
7 come from Mr. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case,  
8 wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with  
9 a letter so requesting.

10 This has come up before, during the Watergate hearings, as  
11 I think it has been placed very vividly in our minds; ~~in that is~~  
12 take care that you just don't follow the request of some  
13 underling who does not truly reflect the desire of the President.

14 Senator Huddleston. Just one more question about  
15 techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad  
16 projects undertaken.

17 Would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional  
18 oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department  
19 with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have  
20 some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent  
21 with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent  
22 with the very protections?

23 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said to the  
24 oversight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now  
25 see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of

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1 informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our  
2 present activities. I think this is the only way that we can  
3 exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to  
4 accomplish and what I want to accomplish.

5 Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect  
6 of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad  
7 direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects  
8 that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such  
9 things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence  
10 is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this  
11 type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap  
12 again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction  
13 and total permission to move in a certain direction and go  
14 beyond what is intended or what was authorized.

15 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.

16 The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

17 Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI  
18 electronic surveillance of Dr. King, several tapes of  
19 specific conversations, and later a composite King tape were  
20 produced.

21 Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?

22 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

23 Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you?

24 Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

25 Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by any of your

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staff, to your knowledge?

2 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed.  
3 I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of  
4 this particular section. There has been no review of them  
5 since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.

6 Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to  
7 the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear  
8 them?

9 Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is  
10 of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to  
11 be a discussion of this in an executive session.

12 The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the  
13 Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and  
14 decided that it would compound the original error for the  
15 staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still  
16 further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from  
17 insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was  
18 unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at  
19 what we needed to know about the King case.

20 So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue  
21 never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information  
22 before the Senator.

23 Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of  
24 the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if,  
25 and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to



1 ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase  
2 or whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am  
3 not advocating it; I am merely asking a question. They would  
4 be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and  
5 decided on it.

6 Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my juris-  
7 diction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the  
8 Attorney General.

9 Senator Goldwater. I see.

10 Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance  
11 routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a  
12 target of inquiry?

13 Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years:

14 Senator Goldwater. Ten years.

15 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

16 Senator Goldwater. What is the future value, if any,  
17 to the Bureau of retaining such information?

18 Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a  
19 destruction or erasure, we will abide by it. We will, on those  
20 occasions where we think that matters might come up within  
21 that period of time which may need the retention of them, we  
22 will express our opinion at that time, but other than that  
23 we would be guided by guidelines.

24 Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate  
25 law enforcement needs should outweigh privacy considerations

1 with respect to retention of such information, or do we need  
2 the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials  
3 when the investigation purposes for which they were collected  
4 have been served?

5 Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close  
6 look at the retention of material, and we would, of course, like  
7 to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.

8 Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank  
9 you very much.

10 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

11 Senator Mondale?

12 Senator Mondale. Mr. Director, it seems to me that the  
13 most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the  
14 invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines,  
15 limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can  
16 and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments,  
17 and the question is, where should that line be drawn?

18 As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and  
19 Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at  
20 criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we  
21 go beyond the authority imposed upon us to get into political  
22 ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.

23 Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to  
24 draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are  
25 restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of

1 crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather  
2 than to leave this very difficult to define and control area  
3 of political ideas?

4 Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last  
5 statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that,  
6 I feel that, certainly we should be vested and should continue  
7 in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory  
8 objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based  
9 on statutes in the so-called security field, national or  
10 foreign.

11 These are criminal violations. I feel that they should  
12 be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this  
13 atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have  
14 more personnel working together, covering the same fields.  
15 I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence  
16 matters, because it is a concomitant. It naturally flows  
17 from the investigation of the security matters and the  
18 criminal.

19 Senator Mondale. Mr. Kelley, what Mr. Stone said was  
20 this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned  
21 with political or other opinions of individuals. It is  
22 concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws  
23 of the United States. When the police system goes beyond  
24 these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of  
25 justice and human liberty.

1 Do you object to that definition?

2 Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more  
3 sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's  
4 area of concern some matters which were probably not as important  
5 at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in  
6 touch with the security investigations and the gathering of  
7 intelligence is something which has proved to be at times  
8 troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable,  
9 productive procedure.

10 I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely  
11 of ~~this~~ course, but I can tell you about the procedure today.

12 Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if  
13 that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that  
14 at that point it becomes so difficult to guarantee, and in  
15 fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't  
16 see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in  
17 the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of  
18 meaningful oversight on a function as nebulous as the one  
19 you've just defined.

20 If the FBI possesses the authority to investigate  
21 ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's  
22 security, particularly in the light of the record that we have  
23 seen how that definition can be stretched to include practi-  
24 cally everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders,  
25 war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed

1 that would provide any basis for oversight?

2 How can you, from among other things, be protected from  
3 criticism later on that you exceeded your authority or didn't  
4 do something that some politician tried to pressure you into  
5 doing?

6 Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years  
7 from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be  
8 criticized for doing that which today is construed as very  
9 acceptable.

10 Senator Mondale. Correct. And I have great sympathy  
11 for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.

12 Mr. Kelley. And the Director.

13 Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is  
14 why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines  
15 as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured  
16 to do things, or when, after the fact, people with good 20/20  
17 hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say  
18 well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specific-  
19 ally say this, and that is your answer. We have to live by  
20 the law. If we don't define it specifically, it seems to me  
21 that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's  
22 possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to  
23 be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what  
24 you should have done.

25 Don't you fear that?

1 Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a  
2 great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have  
3 come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact  
4 that I think that we have a different type of spirit today  
5 in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in,  
6 that I think the Bureau is a matchless organization, and they  
7 are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact  
8 that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the  
9 organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we  
10 had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in  
11 the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.

12 We may not be able to project this on all occasions,  
13 because we must equate this with the need and with our  
14 experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're  
15 going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there <sup>is</sup> ~~be a~~  
16 flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those  
17 guidelines.

18 Senator Mondale. I think, as you know, I don't think  
19 there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified  
20 law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I  
21 think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been,  
22 from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of  
23 enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you  
24 are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you  
25 get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that the

1 great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably  
2 going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no  
3 matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get  
4 into trouble.

5 Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost  
6 every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter  
7 of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate  
8 from the normal course. I feel that within the Bureau there is  
9 less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working  
10 with you we can at least make some achievements that will be  
11 significant.

12 Now, whether it <sup>will</sup> be lasting, I don't <sup>know</sup> ~~think so~~, but I  
13 think we've made a good start.

14 Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August  
15 9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure  
16 of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.

17 Which liberties did you have in mind?

18 Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been mis-  
19 understood many, many times.

20 Senator Mondale. Well, I want you to have a chance to  
21 clear it up.

22 Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement  
23 of the approach which the courts historically have used in  
24 resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its  
25 recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute

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1 protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth  
 2 Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it  
 3 does not prohibit searches and seizures. <sup>AS</sup> I mention<sup>ed</sup>, it only  
 4 refers to those that are unreasonable.

5 I came from the police field. What is more restrictive  
 6 to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be  
 7 more chaotic is if you did not have traffic regulation. We  
 8 do have to , in order to live in the complexities and  
 9 intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our  
 10 rights.

11 Some may construe this as an extravagant statement. If it  
 12 is <sup>as</sup>, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there  
 13 has to be a balance.

14 Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give  
 15 up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you  
 16 mean -- let me ask. Let me scratch that and ask again, you  
 17 have to give up some rights. Which rights would you have us  
 18 give up?

19 Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would  
 20 have the right for search and seizure.

21 Senator Mondale. You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amend-  
 22 ment right.

23 Mr. Kelley. Oh, no, not the right.

24 Senator Mondale. What right do you have in mind?

25 Mr. Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure.



1 Senator Mondale. There's no such right in the Consti-  
2 tution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable,  
3 under court warrant.

4 Did you mean to go beyond that?

5 Mr. Kelley. That's right.

6 Senator Mondale. That you should be able to go beyond  
7 that?

8 Mr. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever  
9 go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.

10 Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, Mr. Kelley, that  
11 that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?

12 Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I  
13 made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which  
14 yes, it was inartful.

15 Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in  
16 law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were  
17 saying something different, that it was taken to mean something  
18 different than I think you intended.

19 What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law  
20 enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined  
21 by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling  
22 of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.

23 That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?

24 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my  
25 speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't

1 understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual.  
2 I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.

3 Senator Mondale. What you are saying in effect is that,  
4 in effect, the rights of the American people can be determined  
5 not by the Director of the FBI but by the courts and by the  
6 law.

7 You meant that.

8 Mr. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir.

9 Senator Mondale. All right.

10 Thank you..

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1 The Chairman. Senator Hart.  
2 Senator of Colorado. Mr. Kelley, in response to  
3 a question by Senator Mondale, one of his first questions about  
4 laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was  
5 we could work together. That is to say the Bureau and the  
6 Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably  
7 hamper you from investigations of crime control in the  
8 country.

9 But I think implicit in his question was also an area  
10 that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind  
11 of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau  
12 from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political  
13 figures, particularly in the White House?

14 And we've had indications that at least two of your  
15 predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr.  
16 Gray was under great pressure from the White House to use  
17 the facilities of the Bureau and their capabilities to accomplish  
18 some political end.

19 Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer  
20 restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is  
21 not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.

22 What kind of restrictions can we lay down to protect you  
23 from political pressures? I'd be interested in that sign of the  
24 coin, if you would.

25 Mr. Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would

1 protect me or any successor from this type of thing. I think  
2 that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines  
3 as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might  
4 be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any  
5 consideration of such directives.

6 Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?

7 Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.

8 Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been  
9 a problem for the people that preceded you?

10 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

11 Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the  
12 Congress ought to address?

13 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

14 Senator Hart of Colorado. The Committee received a  
15 letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the  
16 Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying  
17 out the investigation or their efforts to review the investi-  
18 gation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther  
19 King, Jr., in order to determine whether that investigation  
20 should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked  
21 for our transcripts, the testimony before the Committee, all  
22 material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates  
23 to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

24 I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Depart-  
25 ment asking this Committee for FBI files?

3 1 Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files.  
2 I think they're asking for what testimony was given by  
3 witnesses whose testimony has not been given up. I don't know.

4 Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all  
5 material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates  
6 to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

7 I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department  
8 asking this Committee for material provided to us by the  
9 FBI?

10 Mr. Kelley. Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I  
11 just ask --

12 (Pause)

13 Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one.  
14 Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did  
15 they have a copy also? Yes, they had a retained copy. I  
16 don't know why.

17 Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you  
18 provided us that's not available to the Justice Department?

19 Mr. Kelley. That's right.

20 Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why  
21 an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee  
22 for your records?

23 Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

24 Senator Hart of Colorado. You released a statement on  
25 November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's counterintelligence

1 program and you said you made a detailed study of COINTELPRO  
2 activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote:

3 "The purpose of these counter<sup>intelligence</sup> programs was  
4 to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against  
5 individuals, organizations and institutions both public  
6 and private across the United States."

7 Now, we had an FBI informant in the other day before this  
8 Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of  
9 occasions he planned violent acts against black people in  
10 groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the  
11 FBI actually prevented violence from taking place.

12 How does his testimony square with your statement that  
13 I have quoted?

14 Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of  
15 his statements, <sup>which are</sup> ~~contrary~~ to what we have said, <sup>that</sup> ~~is~~ the truth.

16 We don't subscribe to what he said. We have checked into it  
17 and we know of no instances where, for example, <sup>the</sup> 15-minutes <sup>story</sup>  
18 ~~occurred and we failed to take some action.~~  
~~and that type of thing has been substantiated.~~

19 Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony  
20 he gave us under oath was not accurate?

21 Mr. Kelley. Right.

22 Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement,  
23 and I quote: "I want to assure you that Director Hoover did  
24 not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the FBI  
25 was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against

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1 revolutionary and violence-prone groups.

2 Now, the Committee has received testimony that the New  
3 Left COINTELPRO programs was not, in fact, told to higher  
4 authorities, the Attorney General and Congress.

5 Do you have any information in this regard?

6 I know in that statement you cite <sup>one</sup> or two instances,  
7 but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record  
8 seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic  
9 information flowing upward through the chain of command to  
10 Director Hoover's superiors?

11 Mr. Kelley: May I ask that I be given the opportunity  
12 to substantiate that with documentation?

13 Senator Hart of Colorado. Sure.

14 Mr. Kelley: Or respond to it.

15 Senator Hart of Colorado. Director Kelley, just in  
16 passing, do you agree with the statement made by President  
17 Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy  
18 Dr. King should be brought to justice.

19 Mr. Kelley. Those who <sup>were</sup> directly responsible, and upon whose orders  
20 the activities were taken <sup>are</sup> responsible. I don't know if he intended to say  
21 that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar  
22 as my own opinion is concerned, <sup>should</sup> that it be centered on those who said  
23 to do it <sup>and</sup> those who are responsible.

24 I took the responsibility for any such program and I  
25 don't expect that those under me would be not acting in

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1 accordance with what they think is proper and may even have  
2 some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that  
3 responsibility.

4 I think that it should rest on those who instructed that  
5 that be done.

6 Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people  
7 who give the orders should be brought to justice.

8 Mr. Kelley. I do.

9 The Chairman. Aren't they all dead?

10 Mr. Kelley. No.

11 The Chairman. Not quite?

12 Mr. Kelley. Not quite.

13 Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, Mr. Chairman.

14 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

15 Director Kelley, in the Committee's review of the  
16 COINTELPRO ~~program~~ and other political involvements of the  
17 FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three  
18 basic questions.

19 Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee  
20 is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for  
21 the future, what I would think would be our constructive  
22 legislative work, it is very important that we focus on what  
23 we learned in that investigation.

24 And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of  
25 the United States have from time to time ordered the FBI to



7 1 obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the  
2 necessary surveillance to obtain and to have a purely  
3 political character, that they simply wanted to have for their  
4 own personal purposes.

5 I think that you would agree that that is not a proper  
6 function of the FBI, and you agree.

7 Yet, it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI,  
8 including the Director, to turn down a President of the United  
9 States if he receives a direct order from the President. It  
10 is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist,  
11 I will resign. But that puts a very hard burden on any man  
12 serving in your position, particularly if the President puts  
13 a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or  
14 even invents some excuse. It is always easy for him to say,  
15 you know, I am considering Senator White for an important  
16 position in my administration, and I need to know more about  
17 his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause  
18 for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in  
19 his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you  
20 to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's  
21 been doing lately.

22 It's difficult for you to say back to the President, Mr.  
23 President, that's a very questionable activity for the FBI,  
24 and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real  
25 reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition

1 to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and  
2 you want to get something on him.

3 I mean, you know, the Director can hardly talk back that  
4 way, and I'm wondering what we could do in the way of protecting  
5 your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this  
6 basic charter that we write.

7 Now, I want your suggestions, but let's begin with one  
8 or two of mine. I would like your response.

9 If we were to write into the law that any order given you  
10 either by the President or by the Attorney General should be  
11 transmitted in writing and should clearly state the objective  
12 and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain  
13 those written orders and that furthermore they would be  
14 available to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the  
15 joint committee on intelligence is established, that committee  
16 would have access to such a file.

17 So that the committee itself would be satisfied that  
18 orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or  
19 unlawful.

20 What would you think of writing a provision of that kind  
21 into a charter for the FBI?

22 Mr. Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order  
23 issued by the President that is a request for action by the  
24 Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my  
25 opinion, ~~is~~ a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in

1 contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes  
2 or some that will say no, but I think we could define an  
3 area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could  
4 do that.

5 Now as to the availability to any oversight committee  
6 of Congress, I would say generally that I certainly would have  
7 no objection to this, but ~~X~~ again, there may be some request  
8 for something of high confidentiality that the President might  
9 put in writing such as some national or foreign security  
10 matter.

11 I would like to have such a consideration be given a  
12 great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review  
13 be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would  
14 present a problem.

15 I have said previously that I feel I can discuss every-  
16 thing except the identity of the informants to the oversight  
17 committee. I welcome that.

18 The Chairman. Well, that has been, of course, the way we  
19 proceeded with this Committee. It has worked pretty well,  
20 I think.

21 Now, Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the  
22 Martin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question.

23 If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs  
24 to be preserved for ~~ongoing~~ <sup>on-going</sup> criminal investigations, and since

1 why are they preserved? Why aren't they simply destroyed?  
2 Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable  
3 the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information  
4 that it has collected that it is no longer needed or may never  
5 have connected the person with any criminal activity? And  
6 yet, all of that information just stays there in the files  
7 year after year.

8 What can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's  
9 not the problem, then what is? Why are these tapes still down  
10 there at the FBI?

11 Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, we do have the rule that  
12 they are maintained ten years. Now, why the rule is your  
13 question and why, right now, are they maintained? Since we  
14 do maintain everything since the inquiry has started and until  
15 that's lifted, we can't destroy anything.

16 I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines  
17 or legislation and again, as I have said, there should be  
18 some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there  
19 might be some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation  
20 himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.

21 I think you have to deliberate this very carefully, but  
22 it can be done and we are willing to be guided by those  
23 rules.

24 The Chairman. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting  
25 thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees

1 to Federal positions. As a matter of fact, the only time I  
2 ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his  
3 badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr.  
4 so and so, who's being considered for an executive office.  
5 And we have a very brief conversation in which I tell him that  
6 as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that  
7 is about the extent of it.

8 Then when this file is completed and the person involved  
9 is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that  
10 file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is  
11 in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old  
12 neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.

13 What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?

14 Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some  
15 files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. We  
16 have some archival rules which govern the retention of material  
17 ~~and~~ <sup>which</sup> is developed in cases involving certain members of the  
18 Executive Branch of the government.

19 I see no reason why this would not be a proper area  
20 for consideration of legislation.

21 The Chairman. Can you give me any idea of how much --  
22 do you have records that would tell us how much time and money  
23 is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands  
24 of routine investigations on possible Presidential appointments

25 to Federal offices?

1 Mr. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. I do not  
2 have it now, but if you would like to have the annual cost  
3 for the investigation of Federal appointees --

4 The Chairman. Yes. Plus, you know, plus any other  
5 information that would indicate to us what proportion of the  
6 time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of  
7 activity.

8 Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, but  
9 I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the  
10 approximate expense.

11 The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is  
12 a matter we need more information about. And when you supply  
13 that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number  
14 of such investigations each year?

15 You know, I don't expect you to go back 20 or 25 years,  
16 but give us a good idea of the last few years. For example,  
17 enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the  
18 reach of these investigations may be.

19 Mr. Kelley. Through '70?

20 The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.

21 The other matter that is connected to this same subject  
22 that I would like your best judgment on is whether these  
23 investigations could not be limited to offices of sensitivity.  
24 That is to say where legitimate national security interest might  
25 be involved so that there is a reason to make a close check on

1 past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.

2 I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate  
3 routine Federal offices that are not particularly sensitive  
4 in the national security sense from the reach of these FBI  
5 checks.

6 And so when you respond to the series of questions, I  
7 wish you would include the offices that are now covered by  
8 such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the  
9 Federal bureaucracy this extends.

10 Could you do that?

11 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

12 The Chairman. Fine.

13 Now there is a vote. The vote always comes just at  
14 the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional  
15 questions for the record, and there may be other questions,  
16 too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will ask  
17 Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going  
18 to be tied up on the floor with votes.

19 But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony,  
20 Mr. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the  
21 way you have cooperated with the Committee in the course of  
22 its investigation during the past months.

23 Mr. Kelley. Thank you.

24 The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result

25 of the work of the Committee we can write a generic law for

the FBI that will help to remedy many of the problems we'll  
encounter in the future.

Thank you.

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Page 4

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.

2 On page 5 of your statement --

3 Mr. Kelley. What?

4 Mr. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third  
5 full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then  
6 to question about what you said. "We must recognize that  
7 situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the  
8 future where the Government may well be expected to depart from  
9 its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative  
10 and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps  
11 which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or  
12 property."

13 Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what  
14 kind of situation?

15 And can you give some concrete examples under your general  
16 principles statement?

17 Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to  
18 that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an  
19 employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's  
20 going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you  
21 have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and  
22 so, therefore, you must take some steps to meet that imminent  
23 threat to human life or property.

24 Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the  
25 principle. You are saying the extremist has said he is going

1 to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something, and  
2 he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.

3 Is that the presumption?

4 Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you  
5 can extend <sup>d</sup> it.

6 Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the  
7 traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.

8 Mr. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not  
9 gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had  
10 not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts,  
12 are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of  
13 human life or property?

14 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

15 Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act  
16 to buy the poison or to get in the car with the poison, there  
17 is not by definition any threat to life or property.

18 Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business  
19 a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued,  
20 and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think  
21 take <sup>ing</sup> these threats as being empty ones, because so many times  
22 they have been acted upon.

23 I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to  
24 kill me, and it was said later on <sup>was</sup> it's ~~not~~ rhetoric. It's  
25 not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to

1 kill me, that just means one thing.

2 Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.

3 Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreeing with me. You're saying  
4 on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible  
5 threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where  
6 ~~we don't lose~~<sup>ING</sup> the capability of doing something. We don't  
7 say we should initiate <sup>IT</sup> ourselves. We say that we should go to  
8 the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that  
9 we should act independently because maybe we don't have the  
10 judicial review <sup>O</sup> the capability of determining, but we do  
11 think that we should report it and thereafter see what can  
12 be done.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of  
14 our discussion the standard on page 5.

15 On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat.

16 Mr. Kelley. Yes.

17 Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible  
18 threat.

19 Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.

20 Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right.

21 Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than  
22 arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to  
23 prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other  
24 than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have  
25 in mind?

1 Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever  
2 is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as  
3 impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.

4 Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or --

5 Mr. Kelley. I don't know what it would be.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion.

7 Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening  
9 an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with  
10 a standard which said you would have to have an immediate  
11 threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal  
12 crime involving violence?

13 Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out  
14 so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.

15 Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit  
16 you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from  
17 what you think would be an acceptable standard.

18 Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might  
19 be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to  
20 do it the next minute. In that case it may <sup>THAT YOU ARE</sup> ~~be necessary for~~  
21 ~~you to, not with the presence of the possibility~~ not able  
22 to do anything except put him under arrest, ~~or anything.~~

23 Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.

24 And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action.

25 Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.

1 Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening  
2 of an investigation into a domestic group.

3 Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the  
4 test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving  
5 violence?

6 Mr. Kelley. To open a domestic security case.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

8 Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist  
9 activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities  
10 under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where  
12 it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic  
13 group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious  
14 federal crime involving violence?

15 Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and  
16 they have been well defined as to what is the possible  
17 opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been  
18 discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances,  
19 but there are other criteria that are used, yes.

20 Mr. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be?

21 Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations  
22 over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the  
23 most used of the basis. *is. And* then you have, of course, some  
24 intelligence investigations which should, ~~of course~~ be of  
25 short duration. *lead into* If there is no showing of this ~~into~~ action

1 or a viable intent.

2 Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the  
3 intelligence investigation?

4 Mr. Kelley. By intelligence investigation, yes, you  
5 are looking to prevent.

6 Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and  
7 what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined  
8 with an intent to take an issue?

9 Mr. Kelley. And the capability.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And the capability.

11 All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and  
12 I appreciate very much your time.

13 Mr. Kelley. That's all right.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has  
15 been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti-  
16 mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that  
17 relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood  
18 of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to  
19 collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning  
20 let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the  
21 political views of a person on the other?

22 Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what  
23 many of our problems <sup>are</sup> and perhaps the guidelines can define *them*.  
24 ~~this type of things~~ I think probably you will agree that  
25 within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex

1 lives, there might be something that is relevant. I would say  
2 ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I  
3 think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or  
4 some view that advocates violence or the overthrow of the  
5 government.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two limits on political  
7 views?

8 Mr. Kelley. What?

9 Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political  
10 views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence  
11 or advocants of overthrow?

12 Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat  
13 or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging,  
14 but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's  
15 a member of some other organization.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Is the standard you used on collection of  
17 sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything  
18 might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of  
19 balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's  
20 justifiable to collect that kind of information on American  
21 citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes?

22 Mr. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been  
23 included in some reports as a result of the requirement that  
24 that is what is required by our rules, that when a person  
25 reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar

1 as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later,  
2 I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether  
3 or not this is something we should retain, and we would not  
4 object to anything reasonable in that regard.

5 Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

6 Taking the current manual and trying to understand its  
7 applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King  
8 case, under Section 87 there is a -- permission is granted to  
9 open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive  
10 groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is  
11 received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to  
12 systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group  
13 or organization, an investigation can be opened."

14 Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used  
15 in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership  
16 Conference in the 1960s, so that investigation could still be  
17 open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.

18 Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of  
19 clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch  
20 as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil-  
21 trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered  
22 organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the  
23 benefit of the country.

24 Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that  
25 under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be



1 opened today?

2 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

3 Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question.

4 Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only  
5 of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a  
6 group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investi-  
7 gation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals  
8 or people who come into contact with it?

9 Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely. If  
10 you mean that we go into the non-subversive group, that we  
11 then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the  
12 infiltrators, but the non-<sup>infiltrators</sup> that we conduct a lengthy investigation  
13 of them without any basis for doing so other than that they  
14 are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but  
15 off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much.

17 Mr. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of  
18 inquiry, Mr. Kelley.

19 I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel was  
20 raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you  
21 talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between  
22 intelligence gathering and law enforcement kinds of functions.  
23 Nevertheless, though, I think that you have made an effort,  
24 indeed, the Bureau's organizational scheme reflects an effort  
25 to distinguish some of this has been made.

1 Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage  
2 effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the  
3 Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of  
4 this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's  
5 law enforcement position?

6 Mr. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does  
7 a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background  
8 of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which  
9 all counterintelligence people have is very helpful. It is help-  
10 ful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also  
11 enters into ~~this~~ <sup>the</sup> field, ~~a person with~~ <sup>of a</sup> a broad understanding  
12 of ~~the~~ rights and privileges, and you don't have so much <sup>of</sup> that  
13 spy type; that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type  
14 of an operation.

15 I subscribe to the present system heartily.

16 Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission  
17 if within the Bureau guidelines were established that  
18 effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of  
19 the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a  
20 situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist  
21 the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question  
22 that there should be access to it.

23 Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that  
24 intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing  
25 of lines there with the information legitimately needed for

1 law enforcement?

2 Mr. Kelley. There is always a problem when there is wide  
3 dissemination, because that just numerically increases the  
4 possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything  
5 of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile  
6 to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to  
7 close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of.

8 Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you.

9 We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about  
10 the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department  
11 regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the  
12 King case in particular.

13 As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel,  
14 I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some  
15 insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.

16 What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that  
17 an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved  
18 improperly?

19 Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it  
20 routinely referred to the Justice Department?

21 Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of  
22 procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for  
23 Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the  
24 great majority of the cases turned over to our <sup>inspection</sup>~~investigative~~  
25 Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual

1 occasion, be a designation of a special task force made up,  
2 perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is  
3 handled internally at present.

4 Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be  
5 reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary  
6 step?

7 I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all,  
8 I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the  
9 Bureau police itself, and then secondly, is the Department of  
10 Justice involved in the police determinations?

11 For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with  
12 the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered  
13 the action against King should be the subject of investigation  
14 and maybe prosecution?

15 How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?

16 Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those  
17 activities which we construe as improper or possibly illegal.  
18 There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised  
19 of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own  
20 investigating, and this is something that we feel is a  
21 decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we  
22 have within our own organization sufficient capability to  
23 handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled  
24 independently of us.

25 Mr. Smothers. Thank you.

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That is all I have.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

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